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Decisional and Behavioral Procrastination:
How They Relate to Self-Discrepancies
Lucía E. Orellana-Damacela
R. Scott Tindale
Yolanda Suárez-Balcázar
Loyola University of Chicago
A self-discrepancy is a gap between the perceived real self and other
standards like the ideal self. One hundred and eighty-one college
students completed a self-report measure of self-discrepancies and
decisional and behavioral procrastination. Regression analysis showed
that overall dysfunctional procrastination (the composite measure of
both kinds of procrastination) significantly varied as a function of self-
discrepancies. The amount of variance explained was small. Those
scoring high in self-discrepancies were more likely to be dysfunctional
procrastinators than those scoring low. The discrepancy between the
actual-self and the ought-to self was the strongest predictor of dysfunc-
tional procrastination. When decisional and behavioral procrastination
were analyzed separately, only decisional procrastination significantly
varied as a function of self-discrepancies.
Even though almost every researcher on procrastination contributes
a particular definition (see Ferrari, Johnson, & McCown, 1995, chap. 1,
for a review), all are based on the common definition of the word: “to put
things off.” Sabini and Silver (1982) argue that procrastination is a
nonadaptive behavior—a delay that carries the risk of negative conse-
quences for the individual. By procrastinating, a person is delaying a
behavior that is conducive to completing a task or meeting a goal. Thus,
the paradox of this behavior is that people put off doing what would lead
to accomplishing personal goals.
Previous research has found that procrastination is a widespread
human condition. Among the general population, approximately 20% of
a sample of 211 respondents reported being chronic procrastinators
(Harriott & Ferrari, 1996). Procrastination also affects an important
percentage of college students. Solomon and Rothblum (1984) found
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that 46% of a sample of 342 college students procrastinated while
writing a term paper. Hill, Hill, Chabot, and Barrall (1976) found that
50% of a sample of students reported themselves as “usual” (10%),
“frequent” (17%) and “about half of the time” (23%) procrastinators.
Procrastination has been linked to several negative emotional states
and outcomes. Among college students, procrastinators reported signifi-
cantly fewer semester hour of class enrollment and fewer hours dedi-
cated to study than did non-procrastinators (McCown, Petzel, & Rupert,
1987). In addition, procrastinators perceived this behavior as a problem
that they wanted to reduce (Ferrari, 1991; Ferrari, 1993; Solomon &
Rothblum, 1984).
A growing body of literature offers several self-report measures of
procrastination (see Ferrari et al., 1995, ch. 3, for a review). These self-
reported measures have facilitated the identification of various types of
procrastination: academic, everyday, arousal seeking, decisional, and
behavioral-avoidant procrastination (Effert & Ferrari, 1989; Ferrari, 1992,
1994; Ferrari & McCown, 1994; Milgram, Sroloff & Rosenbaum, 1988;
Solomon & Rothblum, 1984). These types of procrastination seem to be
linked to different underlying motivational factors (Ferrari et. al., 1995).
The present study focused on behavioral-avoidant and decisional
procrastination. The combination of these two types of procrastination is
known in the literature as dysfunctional procrastination, which is defined
as the chronic delay of tasks (Ferrari, 1994). The Adult Inventory of
Procrastination (AIP) (Ferrari et al., 1995) has been found to assess the
behavioral-avoidant type of procrastination. It measures the tendency to
delay the beginning and/or the completion of tasks. In a study conducted
by Ferrari (1992), a factor analysis of the AIP and the Need for Cognition
Scale showed that the AIP inventory scores loaded negatively with a
need for cognition. These findings strongly suggest that the AIP inven-
tory measures procrastination linked to an avoidance motivation.
Decisional procrastination is best understood within the framework
of Janis and Mann’s (1977) conflict model of decision making. They
distinguish between adaptive and nonadaptive patterns of coping with
challenge. One of the nonadaptive patterns is defensive avoidance,
which arises when any alternative available is unsatisfactory or risky and
the decision-maker does not hope to find a better solution. The individual
then may try to escape from making a decision by procrastinating.
Mann’s (1982, as cited in Ferrari et al., 1995) Decisional Procrastination
Scale (DPS) was developed within this framework of decision-making
research (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997). As implied by the
name, this kind of procrastination means to put off making a decision
within some specific time frame.
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A body of studies on dysfunctional procrastination have shown its
association to several personality traits and characteristics (see Ferrari et
al., 1995, chap. 3, for a review). One of the personality characteristics
whose links to procrastination have been explored is self-discrepancies
(Lay, 1994, 1995).
Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986;
Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985; Higgins, 1987) states that people
compare their “actual-self” to internalized standards called “self-guides.”
The “actual-self” is a person’s representation of attributes of the self
(such as being “intelligent,” “sociable,” and so forth). This “actual-self”
corresponds to what is usually recognized in the literature as self-
concept (Moretti & Higgins, 1990). The theory identifies two main types
of self-guides: “ideal-self” and “ought-self.” The ideal-self is a person’s
representation of the attributes that someone (self or other) would ideally
like the person to possess (hopes, wishes, goals, or aspirations). The
“ought-self” is a person’s representation of the attributes that someone
(self or other) believes the person should or ought to possess (sense of
duty, rules, obligations or responsibilities). In sum, the theory posits four
main kinds of self-guides: ideal/own, ideal/other, ought/own, and ought/
other (Higgins et al., 1985; Higgins et al., 1986; Higgins, 1987).
These different representations of the self can be conflictive or
contradictory, and a source of emotional discomfort. A self-discrepancy
is a disagreement or gap between two of these self-representations.
According to the theory, people are motivated to minimize the gap
between their actual-self and self-guides by matching their actual-self to
these self-guides. Actual–ideal (ideal/own and ideal/other) and actual–
ought (ought/own and ought/other) are the self-discrepancies more often
studied in the literature. Both actual–ideal and actual–ought discrepan-
cies lead to different self-regulatory strategies and are accompanied by
distinct affective components (Higgins et al., 1985; Higgins et al., 1986).
The theory predicts that self-regulation aimed to close the actual-
ideal discrepancy would rely mainly on a strategy of “approaching the
desired end-states.” Individuals who possess this type of discrepancy are
motivated to obtain–or maintain—the positive outcomes presumed to be
obtained by matching the ideal self-guides. They are motivated to
maximize the presence of positive outcomes and minimize the absence
of positive outcomes. The emotions corresponding to this state are
dejection-related, such as dissatisfaction and embarrassment (Higgins et
al., 1985; Higgins et al., 1986; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994).
The self-regulation aimed to close the actual-ought discrepancy, on the
other hand, would rely mainly on a strategy of “avoiding mismatches to
desired end-states.” Individuals who possess this discrepancy are moti-
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vated to avoid the negative outcomes associated with violating these
self-guides. They are oriented to maximize the absence of negative
outcomes and to minimize the presence of negative outcomes. Emotions
linked to this tendency are agitation-related, such as feelings of fear,
anxiety, and worry (Higgins et al., 1985; Higgins et al., 1986; Higgins et
al., 1994).
So far, the studies linking procrastination to self-discrepancies (Lay,
1994, 1995) have focused on the affective components of the self-
discrepancy theory. Lay (1995) found that procrastinators tend to present
higher levels of dejection-related emotions than non-procrastinators. As
the self-discrepancies literature reports, such emotions are related to
actual–ideal discrepancies. Conversely, procrastinators did not present
higher levels of agitation-related emotions, which are linked to actual-
ought discrepancies (Higgins et al., 1986). In Lay’s studies, procrastina-
tion scores were obtained with the General Procrastination Scale (GPS),
which measures an arousal-seeking related procrastination. No studies
of the relationship between procrastination and the cognitive component
of self-discrepancies are reported in the current literature. Such cognitive
component is obtained by measuring the degree of discrepancies be-
tween the perceived actual-self attributes and the ideal-self and ought-
self attributes. Higgins and colleagues have developed an instrument, the
Selves Questionnaire, to measure such discrepancies (Higgins et al.,
1985; Higgins et al., 1986).
The underlying motivational factors for both dysfunctional procras-
tination and actual–ought self-discrepancy have been described in very
similar terms. Whereas the actual–ought discrepancy relies on an avoid-
ance strategy (Higgins et al., 1985), procrastination appears to be a self-
defeating behavior in which people both attempt to reach a desired goal,
and undermine their success by putting off the behaviors conducive to
the goal (Ferrari, 1994; Sabini & Silver, 1982). Procrastinators seem to
maintain an avoidance relationship with their goals. In particular, behav-
ioral procrastination has been found to be strongly linked to avoidance
strategies (Ferrari, 1992). In Janis and Mann’s (1977) theory of decision
making, procrastination is one of the possible strategies emerging from a
defensive avoidance coping pattern. Such a pattern is likely to occur
when individuals have to make decisions under situations of conflict.
In sum, the present study was designed to explore the degree of
relationship between procrastination and self-discrepancies. We ex-
pected a positive significant relationship between these variables. We
predicted that participants who scored higher in actual-ideal (AI) and
actual-ought (AO) self-discrepancies would score significantly higher in
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dysfunctional procrastination. Given the proposed similarities between
the underlying factors on both the cognitive dimension of self-discrepan-
cies and procrastination, AO discrepancy was predicted to be a stronger
predictor of dysfunctional procrastination than AI discrepancy.
METHOD
Participants
One hundred and eighty-one undergraduate students of an introduc-
tory psychology course at a private Midwestern urban university partici-
pated in this study in exchange for course credit. Seventy-four partici-
pants were males (41%), 107 were females (59%). The overall group
mean age was 18.6 (SD = 1.41). Twenty-one participants (11.6%) were
psychology students, whereas 153 (84.5%) declared different majors.
Eighty-two percent were freshman, 12.7% were sophomore, and 4.4%
were juniors.
Measures
The Selves Questionnaire. Self-discrepancies were measured with
the Selves Questionnaire (Higgins, 1987; Van Hook & Higgins, 1988).
Test-retest reliability of the questionnaire reported by Moretti and Higgins
(1990) is .39, p < .05 for AI (actual-ideal) discrepancy and .53, p < .01 for
AO (actual-ought) discrepancy.
Following instructions specified by Higgins and colleagues (Higgins,
1987; Van Hook & Higgins, 1988), participants were asked to generate
five lists of self-attributes on separated sheets. On each of the first three
lists they would report no more than ten traits or attributes of the type of
person they believed they actually are (actual-self list), ideally would
like to be (ideal-self/own standpoint list), and ought to be (ought-self/
own standpoint list). For the other two lists, participants were asked to
identify the person whose opinion about them was the most important
(e.g., mother, father, etc.). They were then asked to generate lists of up to
ten attributes from the standpoint of that person regarding the participant’s
ideal attributes (ideal-self/other standpoint list) and ought attributes
(ought-self/other standpoint list).
The questions were formulated in terms such as: “Please list the
attributes of the type of person you think you actually are” (for the actual
list). In addition, in the actual list, participants were required to rate on a
4 point scale (from 1 = slightly to 4 = extremely) the extent to which they
actually possessed each listed attribute. In the ideal/own list, they were
asked to rate the extent to which they ideally would like to possess each
attribute, and so forth for the other lists.
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Self-discrepancy values were obtained by comparing the actual-self
list with the other lists. An actual–ideal/own standpoint discrepancy
score was generated by comparing the actual and ideal/own lists. The
same procedure was used to obtain the actual–ought/own, the actual–
ideal/other, and the actual–ought/other discrepancy scores.
The comparison between the lists to obtain the discrepancy scores
was made using the following formula (Higgins et al., 1986; Moretti &
Higgins, 1990, p.113)
Discrepancy = (synonymous mismatches) +
(2 × antonymous mismatches) –
(synonymous matches)
Synonymous mismatches are those semantically equivalent attributes
present in both lists that have a difference in ratings of two or more. For
example, the attribute gregarious, from the actual list, which has a rating
of 1, is a synonymous mismatch of sociable, listed in the ideal/own list,
with a rating of 4. Antonymous mismatches are those attributes with an
opposite semantic relation between them, regardless of their rating (e.g.,
shy, from the actual list, is an antonym of outgoing, from the ought/other
list). Synonymous matches are semantically equivalent attributes that
have a difference in ratings of less than two. No-matches, attributes that
were neither synonyms nor antonyms, were excluded from the analysis.
Both synonyms and antonyms were defined according to Roget’s
Thesaurus (Higgins et al., 1986).
Own and other standpoint scores were aggregated across to generate
an actual-ideal (AI) discrepancy score and an actual-ought (AO) score.
In turn, by aggregating these two scores, an overall self-discrepancy
score (SD) was obtained.
Participants were blind to the hypotheses, and the data coders were
blind to the scores obtained by participants in the procrastination mea-
sures. To assess inter-raters reliability, two raters coded 35 randomly
selected questionnaires. The inter-rater reliability for each self-discrep-
ancy was obtained by correlating their scores. Zero order correlations
ranged from .75 to 1.00, with a mean of .96.
Decisional Procrastination. This variable was measured with Mann’s
(1982, as reproduced in Ferrari et al., 1995) Decisional Procrastination
Scale (DPS), and Frost and Show’s (1993) Indecisiveness Scale (IS). In
the present study, both scales were highly correlated, r(181) = .77, p =
.0001. Consequently, a composite decisional procrastination score was
obtained by averaging the scores of both inventories’ items.
The Decisional Procrastination Scale (DPS) is a 5-item scale em-
bedded among five other conflict coping patterns in a 31-item inventory.
Procrastination items include statements such as “I delay making deci-
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sions until it is too late.” Participants had to rank each item from 1 (low)
to 5 (high). The total score was obtained by summing up the responses of
the 5 items. High scores indicate a tendency to put off decisions.
Previous studies have reported a Cronbach alpha ranging from .71 to .80,
and a one-month test-retest reliability of .69 (Effert & Ferrari, 1989;
Ferrari, 1994). With the present sample, the alpha coefficient was .83
(M = 12.85, SD = 3.96).
The Indecisiveness Scale (IS) is a 15-item questionnaire. For each
item, participants indicated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed
with the statement, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). One
of the statements is “I try to put off making decisions.” There are six
items with reversed scores. Frost and Gross (1993), and Frost and Shows
(1993) have reported a good internal reliability for this instrument
(Cronbach alphas of .87 and .90, respectively). The present study had an
alpha coefficient of .87 and a mean score of 41.62 (SD = 9.37). Frost and
Shows validated the questionnaire by relating it with behavioral latency
in decision-making. Participants scoring high in indecisiveness (those
scoring above the 75th percentile) had a significantly higher latency
when deciding about a laboratory task (p < .03) than participants low in
indecisiveness (those scoring below the 25th percentile).
Adult Inventory of Procrastination (AIP). The AIP (McCown &
Johnson, 1989, as reproduced in Ferrari et al., 1995), assessed the
behavioral tendency to put off the beginning and/or the completion of
tasks. This inventory has been used in a wide range of populations,
including traditional and nontraditional college students. This is a 15-
item unidimensional scale. It has seven items with reversed scores. Each
item consisted of a 5-point scale (from 1 = low to 5 = high). The scale
includes items such as: “Putting things off ‘til the last minute has cost me
money in the past year.” Procrastination scores were obtained by sum-
ming up item responses. Previous studies have shown coefficient alphas
ranging from .79 to .83 and a one-month test-retest reliability of .71
(Ferrari, 1994; Ferrari et al., 1995). In the present study, the coefficient
alpha was .89, with a mean score of score of 39.78 (SD = 11.19). Factor
analyses of the questionnaire showed that AIP scores loaded on a factor
that included avoidance of self-relevant cognitive information and low
self-esteem (Ferrari, 1992). The AIP correlated positive and moderately
with DPS, r = .44, p < .001 in Ferrari (1994), and .31, p < .01 in Ferrari
and McCown (1994). With the present sample, the correlation coeffi-
cients for the AIP and the DPS, as well as for the AIP and the IS was .58,
p < .001.
A composite measure of dysfunctional procrastination was obtained
by averaging the item scores of the three procrastination scales (M =
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2.69, SD = .72). Higher scores indicate a higher degree of procrasti-
nation.
Timing of experimental participation. An objective behavioral mea-
sure was used to check the construct validity of the procrastination
inventories. A specific number of research participation hours are re-
quired for each student to obtain course credit at this Midwestern
university. Previous studies have operationally defined procrastinators
as those students signing up late in the semester for research participa-
tion (McCown, Johnson, & Petzel, 1989; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984).
In the present study, participants were classified into two groups: late
signers, those signing up in the last two weeks of class (n = 86) and early
signers, those signing up before the first two weeks of class (n = 63). The
remaining group of participants, those signing in the middle of the
semester, were not included in this analysis.
Procedure
The data were collected in nine sessions of up to 20 participants
each. At each session, participants were greeted and received a packet
containing the consent form, the Selves Questionnaire, the Decisional
Procrastination Scale, the Indecisiveness Scale, and the Adult Inventory
of Procrastination. They were asked to read carefully the questionnaires
and to answer them as honestly as possible. Their answers were anony-
mous. Participants spent approximately thirty minutes filling out the
questionnaires. Once finished, they were debriefed and thanked for their
participation.
RESULTS
Consistent with previous findings in college student samples (Hill et
al., 1976; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984), approximately 50% of the
participants reported moderate to high levels of procrastination. Specifi-
cally, 48.6 % of the participants scored above the 50th percentile in the
composite measure of decisional procrastination (DPS and IS com-
bined); 47.5% participants scored above the 50th percentile in the mea-
sure of behavioral procrastination (AIP).
To explore the construct validity of the self-report measures of
procrastination, a MANOVA was conducted to analyze their relation-
ship with timing of experimental participation. Multivariate tests showed
an overall significant difference between means, F(2,146) = 4.33, p =
.02. Univariate tests revealed a significant difference between groups for
behavioral procrastination, F(1,147) = 8.31, p = .005, η2 = .053. The
mean score for late signers was 42.44 (SD = 10.40); it was 37.57 (SD =
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11) for early signers. As for the composite measure of decisional
procrastination, the difference between groups was not significant,
F(1,147) = 1.50, p = .22, η2 = .01. The mean score for late signers was
55.89 (SD = 12.8) and 53.62, (SD = 12.84) for early signers. A MANOVA
with actual- ideal and actual-ought discrepancy as dependent variables
failed to find significant differences between early and late signers
regarding self-discrepancies.
Descriptive statistics for the self-discrepancy variables are pre-
sented in Table 1. The lower negative scores indicate higher levels of
self-discrepancies. Respondents reported more actual–ideal/own dis-
crepancies than any other, followed by actual–ought/other discrepan-
cies. Overall, actual-ideal (AI) discrepancies were reported more fre-
quently than actual-ought (AO) discrepancies. Actual-self–self-guides
discrepancies were highly correlated with each other, with correlations
ranging from .61 to .95 (see Table 1). One-way ANOVAs detected no
significant differences in procrastination and self-discrepancies when
analyzed by gender, major, and academic standing.
Procrastination and Self-Discrepancies
Self-discrepancy scores were analyzed as continuous variables in
their relationship with procrastination. Zero order correlations between
self-discrepancies and procrastination were very modest, ranging from
.00 to .20. Actual–ought/own discrepancy showed the strongest correla-
tion with both decisional and behavioral procrastination (see Table 2).
TABLE 1 Mean Scores and Zero Order Correlations for Self-
Discrepancies
Variable M SD 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. A-I total -3.97 5.22 .91*** .89*** .79*** .70*** .74*** .95***
2. A-I/own -1.80 3.10 .63*** .69*** .66*** .61*** .86***
3. A-I/other -2.15 2.68 .75*** .62*** .75*** .87***
4. A-O total -4.46 4.96 .92*** .93*** .94***
5. A-O/own -2.58 2.66 .70*** .86***
6. A-O/other -1.93 2.73 .88***
7. Total SD -8.37 9.67
Note: A-I total = Total Actual-Ideal discrepancy; A-I/own = Actual-Ideal discrepancy/
own standpoint; A-I/other = Actual-Ideal discrepancy/other standpoint; A-O total =
Total Actual-Ought discrepancy; A-O/own = Actual-Ought discrepancy/own stand-
point; A-O/other = Actual-Ought discrepancy/other standpoint. N = 181.
*** p < .0001
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We predicted that there would be a significant positive relationship
between self-discrepancies and dysfunctional procrastination. A regres-
sion analysis with the dysfunctional procrastination as the criterion and
the composite measure of self-discrepancies as the predictor was con-
ducted. The regression analysis resulted in a significant association
between the variables, F(1,165) = 5.83, p = .02. The amount of variance
in procrastination explained by self-discrepancies was, however, small,
R2 = .03; Β = .01; SE B = .01; β = .18.
A multiple regression analysis using the stepwise method was
performed with dysfunctional procrastination as the criterion; the four
actual–self-guides discrepancies (AI/own, AI/other, AO /own, and AO/
other) were the predictors. Given the high degree of correlation between
self-discrepancies, it was not surprising that only one of them reached
the .05 criteria and was entered in the equation. Actual–ought/own was
the strongest predictor of dysfunctional procrastination, F(1,165) = 7.15,
p = .01. The amount of variance explained was, again, relatively small,
R2 = .04; B = .05; SE B = .02; β = .20.
A regression analysis using the stepwise procedure with decisional
procrastination as the criterion, and self-discrepancies (AI/own, AI/
other, AO/own, and AO/other) as predictors, resulted in AO/own being
the only self-discrepancy entered in the equation, R2 = .03, F(1,165) =
5.56, p = .02;.β = .04; SE B = .02; β = .18. On the contrary, a regression
TABLE 2 Zero Order Correlation Scores between Self-
Discrepancies and Procrastination Measures
Dysfunctional
Measures Decisional Behavioral (Composite)
1. A-I total .12 .12 .14
2. A-I/own .10 .10 .12
3. A-I/other .11 .12 .13
4. A-O total .17* .14 .19*
5. A-O/own .16* .16* .20**
6. A-O/other .14 .11 .15
7. Total Self-discrepancies .17* .14 .19*
Note: A-I total = Total Actual-Ideal discrepancy; A-I/own = Actual-Ideal discrepancy/
own standpoint; A-I/other = Actual-Ideal discrepancy/other standpoint; A-O total =
Total Actual-Ought discrepancy; A-O/own = Actual-Ought discrepancy/own stand-
point; A-O/other = Actual-Ought discrepancy/other standpoint. N = 181.
*p <.05; **p <.01
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analysis showed that AI and AO self-discrepancies were not signifi-
cantly related to behavioral procrastination. None of the self-discrepan-
cies were entered in the equation.
DISCUSSION
More than half of the present sample of college students reported
moderate to high levels of procrastination. These findings were consis-
tent with previous studies (Hill et al., 1976; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984,
Ferrari, 1993; Harriott & Ferrari, 1996).
In the present study, the procrastination inventories were correlated
to a higher degree than has been reported in past research (Ferrari, 1994;
Ferrari & McCown, 1994). The real life behavioral procrastination
measure, timing of research participation, supported the construct valid-
ity of the paper and pencil procrastination measures. We found a signifi-
cant difference between early and late participants regarding both behav-
ioral and decisional procrastination, with the difference being larger for
behavioral procrastination. Early participants were those signing for
research participation the first two weeks of class, and late participants
were those signing for research participation the last two weeks of class.
Consistent with the main prediction of this study, dysfunctional
procrastination significantly varied as a function of self-discrepancies.
The variables were related in the expected positive direction. Actual–
self-guides discrepancies (AI/own, AO/own, AI/other, AO/other) were
highly correlated; higher than what previous studies have reported. This
high correlation made it impossible to build groups of participants high
in one discrepancy and low in others. Creating such groups has been the
usual way to test the impact of each discrepancy on the dependent
variables, above and beyond the contribution of other discrepancies.
Nonetheless, a regression analysis with the four discrepancies as predic-
tors showed that AO/own was the strongest predictor of overall procras-
tination. Not surprisingly, the cognitive measure of procrastination
(composite decisional procrastination) rather than the behavioral mea-
sure (AIP), was the more strongly associated with the cognitive compo-
nent of self-discrepancy (the perceived gap between different aspects of
the self).
The finding that AO discrepancies showed the strongest relation-
ship with decisional procrastination is consistent with Janis and Mann’s
(1977) theory of decision making in conflict situations. According to
Janis and Mann, defensive avoidance is one of the coping patterns used
in such situations. Similarly, actual-ought discrepancies have been found
to be related to an avoidance motivation. Thus, avoidance may be a
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coping pattern particularly useful in decision situations for individuals
whose perception of their actual-self conflicts with their perception of
their ought-to-be-self.
It is interesting to note that the Adult Inventory of Procrastination
(AIP) was also supposed to tap the avoidance factor underlying procras-
tination. However, the AIP was not related to actual–ought/own or any of
the self-discrepancy measures. This happened in spite of the moderate
correlation between AIP and the measures of decisional procrastination.
It may be that the avoidance pattern underlying behavioral procrastina-
tion is different from the avoidance pattern underlying decisional pro-
crastination. Further exploration of this issue is needed.
Among the domains of the self (actual, ideal and ought), the actual-
ought discrepancy was the strongest predictor of procrastination. This
suggests that individuals are more likely to procrastinate when they are
confronted with a goal that they have to accomplish (a duty), than when
confronted with a goal that they want to reach (a wish). Regarding the
standpoints of the self (own and other standpoints), actual-own stand-
point discrepancy showed higher association with procrastination than
actual-other standpoint discrepancy. In other words, individuals were
more likely to be procrastinators when they had a discrepancy between
what they were and what they thought they should be from their own
standpoint. The discrepancy between what they were and what they
thought they should be from the standpoint of somebody else was not as
important. This suggests that, as Sabini and Silver (1982) have pointed
out, procrastination consists of delaying the performance of actions
conducive to goals that an individual wants to accomplish. When they
are externally forced to perform the action, they do not interpret the delay
as procrastination.
The attempt of the present study, to link a theoretical cognitive
concept (self-discrepancy) with a specific behavior (procrastination),
was partially successful. Even though the degree of relationship between
self-discrepancy and procrastination was small, it was statistically sig-
nificant. Several factors might have affected the results. The differences
between participants in the Selves Questionnaire may not have been due
to differences in self-discrepancies. Instead, they may have been due to
differences in their likelihood to report attributes that remind them of
negative aspects of their self-concept (e.g., shy, or lazy). In those
circumstances, the probability of finding self-discrepancies in the
participant’s response, if any, was lowered or eliminated by the
underreporting of negative self-characteristics. In addition, the coding
system of the Selves Questionnaire was based on eliminating the syn-
onyms within each list (e.g., eliminate “friendly” if “sociable” was listed
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first in the I/own list, etc.). By eliminating attributes listed in the same
list as if they were synonyms, we may be diminishing the ability of the
instrument to measure self-discrepancy in a more ideographic way.
Therefore, future investigations may avoid eliminating synonyms within
the same list when coding the Selves Questionnaire. The results of the
study suggested that general self-discrepancy measures are not very
good predictors of procrastination. Future research should address the
extent to which a self-discrepancy questionnaire on a particular issue is
a good predictor of procrastination on tasks related to that issue.
REFERENCES
Effert, B., & Ferrari, J.R. (1989). Decisional procrastination: Examining person-
ality correlates. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 4, 151–156.
Ferrari, J. (1991). Self-handicapping by procrastinators: Protecting self-esteem,
social esteem, or both? Journal of Research in Personality, 25, 245–261.
Ferrari, J. (1992) Psychometric validation of two procrastination inventories for
adults: Arousal and avoidance measures. Journal of Psychopathology and
Behavioral Assessment, 14, 97–110.
Ferrari, J. (1993). Christmas and procrastination: Explaining lack of diligence at
a “real world” task deadline. Personality and Individual Differences, 14,
25–33.
Ferrari, J. (1994). Dysfunctional procrastination and its relationship with self-
esteem, interpersonal dependency, and self-defeating behaviors. Personal-
ity and Individual Differences, 17, 673–679.
Ferrari, J.R., Johnson, J.L., & McCown, W.G. (Eds.). (1995). Procrastination and
task avoidance. Theory, research, and treatment. New York: Plenum Press.
Ferrari, J., & McCown, W. (1994). Procrastination tendencies among obsessive-
compulsive and their relatives. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 50, 162–
167.
Frost, R.O., & Gross, R.C. (1993). The hoarding of possessions. Behavioral
Research and Therapy, 31, 367–381.
Frost, R.O., & Shows, D.L. (1993). The nature and measurement of compulsive
indecisiveness. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 683–692.
Harriott, J., & Ferrari, J. (1996). Prevalence of procrastination among samples of
adults. Psychological Reports, 78, 611–616.
Higgins, E.T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psycho-
logical Review, 94, 319–340.
Higgins, E.T., Bond, R.N., Klein, R., & Strauman, T. (1986). Self-discrepancies
and emotional vulnerability: How magnitude, accessibility, and type of
discrepancy influence affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
51, 5–15.
Higgins, E.T., Klein, R., & Strauman, T. (1985). Self-concept discrepancy
theory: A psychological model for distinguishing among different aspects
of depression and anxiety. Social Cognition, 3, 51–76.
Higgins, E.T., Roney, C.J.R., Crowe, E., & Hymes, C. (1994). Ideal versus ought
predilections for approach and avoidance: Distinct self-regulatory systems.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 276–286.
238 PROCRASTINATION: CURRENT ISSUES AND NEW DIRECTIONS
Hill, M., Hill, D., Chabot, A., & Barrall, J. (1976). A survey of college faculty and
student procrastination. College Student Personnel Journal, 12, 256–262.
Janis, I.L., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision-making: A psychological analysis of
conflict, choice and commitment. New York: Free Press.
Lay, C.H. (1994). Trait procrastination and affective experiences: Describing
past study behavior and its relation to agitation and dejection. Motivation
and Emotion, 18, 269–284.
Lay, C.H. (1995). Trait procrastination, agitation, dejection, and self-discrep-
ancy. In J.R. Ferrari, J.L. Johnson, & W.G. McCown (Eds.), Procrastina-
tion and task avoidance. Theory, Research, and Treatment (pp. 97–112).
New York: Plenum Press.
Mann, L., Burnett, P., Radford, M., & Ford, S. (1997). The Melbourne Decisional
Making Questionnaire: An instrument for measuring patterns for coping
with decisional conflict. Journal of Behavioral Decision-Making, 10, 1–19.
McCown, W., Johnson, J., & Petzel, T. (1989). Procrastination: A principal
components analysis. Personality and Individual Differences, 10, 197–202.
McCown, W., Petzel, T. & Rupert, P. (1987). An experimental study of some
hypothesized behaviors and personality variables of college student pro-
crastinators. Personality and Individual Differences, 8, 781–786.
Milgram, N.A., Sroloff, B., & Rosenbaum, M. (1988). The procrastination of
everyday life. Journal of Research in Personality, 22, 197–212.
Moretti, M.M., & Higgins, E.T. (1990). Relating self-discrepancy to self-esteem:
The contribution of discrepancy beyond actual-self ratings. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 108–123.
Sabini, J., & Silver, M. (1982). Moralities of everyday life. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Solomon, L., & Rothblum, E.D. (1984). Academic procrastination: Frequency
and cognitive-behavioral correlates. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 31,
503–509.
Van Hook, E., & Higgins, E.T. (1988). Self-related problems beyond the self-
concept: Motivational consequences of discrepant self-guides. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 625–633.

